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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH BRUNYER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah corpora-
tion, and DANIEL NEIL IPSON, 
No. 14267 
Defendants, Appellants 
and Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EMIL ZIGICH, 
Third-Party Defendant 
and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a consolidation of two cases brought by plaintiff 
against defendants for the wrongful death of plaintiff's 
wife and for personal injuries caused to plaintiff. These 
actions arose out of a collision between an automobile in 
which plaintiff and his wife were riding as passengers and 
an automobile owned by defendant Salt Lake County and driven 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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by defendant Ipson, Defendants filed a third-party complaint 
against the driver Zigich seeking an adjudication of his 
percentage of fault, if anyf and a contingent judgment for 
contribution based upon this proportion, 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Third-party defendant Zigich filed a Motion to Dismiss 
defendants1 Third-Party Complaint, This Motion was granted 
by the Honorable Bryant H, Croft on September 16, 1975, 
The District Court ruled that since the automobile accident 
causing the injuries and death occurred before the Utah 
Comparative Negligence Act, of which contribution is a part, 
went into effect, the action was barred because the Act 
was not retroactive to the date of the accident. The court 
also ruled that if contribution were in fact applicable 
to this action the Third-Party Complaint was premature 
since no payment had yet been made by the defendants in 
excess of their pro rata share of liability. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the Revised Order of Dismissal 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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as to third-party defendant and a remand to the lower court 
for trial of this matter including the third-party claim for 
contribution, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because this case has not yet gone to trial, the statement 
of facts must be based upon the allegations contained in the 
pleadings as set forth in the various parties. However, 
there is little factual dispute at this point in time. In 
the early morning hours of April 14, 19 73 Ralph Brunyer and 
his wife Louise were riding as passengers in an automobile 
driven by Emil Zigich. The Brunyers and Mr. Zigich had 
previously been attending a party at which time alcohol 
was consumed by Mr. Zigich. 
At approximately 1:15 a.m., while taking the Brunyers 
back to their residence, the Zigich automobile was proceeding 
south on Main Street and was making a left turn to Gregson 
Avenue. At this instance an automobile driven by Salt 
Lake County Deputy Sheriff Ipson collided with the Zigich 
automobile. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Plaintiff Ralph Brunyer sustained personal injuries in 
the accident and his wife Louise died a short time later of 
injuries sustained from the accident, 
Plaintiff Ralph Brunyer filed a complaint in the District 
Court of Salt Lake (Civil No. 218616) seeking recovery on 
behalf of the heirs of Louise M. Brunyer for her wrongful 
death. Shortly thereafter, he filed a second action in 
the District Court (Civil No, 218644) seeking recovery 
for his own personal injuries (R. 1-7). 
On July 26, 1974 defendants made a motion to consolidate 
the two actions which motion was granted by order of the 
Honorable Gordon R, Hall on September 24, 1974 pursuant to 
stipulation. The two cases were thereafter consolidated 
for all purposes (R. 23-24), 
On May 14, 1975 defendants made their motion for leave 
to file a third-party complaint against Emil Zigich, driver 
of the automobile in which plaintiffs were riding. This 
motion was granted by an order of the Honorable Stewart M. 
Hanson, Jr., June 4, 1975 (R. 68-70). On June 4, 1975 defendants 
filed a third-party complaint against Emil Zigich seeking 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-5-
an apportionment of liability, if any, between the tortfeasors 
and a judgment in contribution (R. 59-61). The third-party 
complaint alleged, inter alia, that Emil Zigich was intoxicated 
at the time of the accident and was guilty of wilful misconduct. 
Affidavits filed subsequent to this complaint stated that the 
alcohol level in Zigich1s blood on the morning of the accident 
was .07% alcohol (R. 95-96). 
On June 27, 1975 Emil Zigich filed his motion to dismiss 
the third-party complaint (R. 74-75). This motion was granted 
and a revised order of dismissal as to the third-party defendant 
was entered on September 16, 1975 (R. 118-120). It is from 
this order that the present appeal is taken. 
The Utah Contribution Statute Title 78, Chapter 27, 
Section 39, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (Supp. 1975) was 
enacted by the Utah State Legislature in 19 73 and became 
effective sixty (60) days following the last day of the 
legislative session, March 8, 1973. 
POINT I 
THE FACTUAL CONTEXT OF THIS CASE DOES NOT REQUIRE 
THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE UTAH CONTRIBUTION 
ACT BECAUSE THE "CAUSE OF ACTION" HAS NOT YET ACCRUED. 
The trial court granted third-party defendant Zigich1s 
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Motion to Dismiss on two grounds: first, "that contribution 
under the Utah Comparative Negligence Act is not retrospective 
in application but prospective" and secondly "that if contribu 
tion should apply to this situation, third-party plaintiff's 
third-party complaint is premature," (R. 119-120,) 
The trial court erred in its judgment based upon both 
of the above reasons. This point will address itself solely 
to the question of the application of the comparative negli-
gence statute. The second point will be treated elsewhere 
in this brief (Point III). 
The 1973 Legislature enacted Chapter 209, Sections 1-7 
concerning the doctrines of comparative negligence and contri-
bution. This act has now been codified in Title 78, Chapter 
27, Section 37 through 43, Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1975). 
The doctrine of comparative negligence, the relationship 
between an injured party and the tortfeasor, is considerably 
different from the doctrine of contribution, the relationship 
between joint tortfeasors. The sole question in this case 
concerns the effect of the contribution statutes upon Utah 
law and does not deal with Sections 37 and 38 relating to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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comparative negligence. The categorization by the trial 
court's order of dismissal that the "Comparative Negligence 
Act" is incorrect since the legislation clearly contains 
two subject matters: comparative negligence and contribution. 
Without elaborating, it suffices to say that comparative 
negligence affects the defense an alleged tortfeasor may 
have against a complaining plaintiff whereas contribution has 
no effect whatsoever to the relationship of plaintiff and 
tortfeasor. As will be developed throughout this brief, 
this distinction is of crucial importance when dealing 
with these two concepts. 
Section 78-27-39 is the building block of the Utah 
Contribution Statute. It states: 
The right of contribution shall exist among 
joint tortfeasors, but a joint tortfeasor shall 
not be entitled to a money judgment for contribu-
tion until he has, by payment, discharged the 
common liability or more than his pro rata share 
thereof. 
Section 78-27-40 defines a joint tortfeasor as "one of two 
or more persons, jointly or severally liable in tort for the 
same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment 
has been recovered against all or some of them." This same 
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section states that "the relative degrees of fault of the 
joint tortfeasors shall be considered in determining their 
pro rata sharesf solely for the purpose of determining their 
rights of contribution among themselves, each remaining 
severally liable to the injured person for the whole injury 
as at common law." 
This statutory enactment clearly changes the previous 
common law that contribution between joint tortfeasors was 
not permissible. Hardman v. Matthews, 1 Utah 2d 110, 262 
P.2d 748 (1953). , 
The new law allows contribution to exist when one joint 
tortfeasor has paid to a plaintiff a disproportionate share 
of his adjudicated liability. As before, however, the plaintiff 
is in no way affected by this statute since he may still 
opt to take the full judgment against any one joint tortfeasor 
regardless of the relative degrees of fault among them. 
Thus, as previously discussed, a plaintiff is in no way 
restricted or damaged by the enactment of the contribution 
statute. 
The trial court categorized the contribution statute 
(erroneously termed the Utah Comparative Negligence Act) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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as not "retrospective in application, but prospective" and 
specifically stated that the "plaintiff's claim against the 
defendants and third-party plaintiff arose as a result of 
an accident which occurred on April 14, 1973, prior to the 
effective date of the Utah Comparative Negligence Act, to 
wit: May 8, 1973 (R. 119-120), 
Thus, the simple chronological history upon which this 
appeal turns is as follows: the accident occurred on April 
14, 1973; the contribution statutes were passed by the 1973 
Legislature which adjourned on March 8, 19 73; the normal 
60-day waiting period for a statute to become law placed 
the effective date of enactment to May 8, 19 73; the original 
complaint was filed by plaintiff on April 4, 1974 (R. 3); 
finally, the motion for leave to file a third-party complaint 
was made on May 13, 19 75 (R. 45-46) and was granted on June 
4, 1975 (R. 68-69). There has been no adjudication as to 
the claims between plaintiff and defendants and no settlement 
or releases have been made by any of the parties to this 
action. 
The trial court characterized the date of the accident 
as the controlling time to determine the application of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the contribution statute. The trial court then continued 
its reasoning by stating that the statute was not retroactive 
and therefore did not apply to accidents preceding the 
effective date of the statute. 
The trial court erred in its characterization of the 
contribution statute as retroactive since the acts giving rise 
to the cause of action based upon contribution have not yet 
occurred and cannot, therefore, be said to have predated the 
enactment of the statute. 
The trial court erred in its interpretation that the 
date of the accident was the controlling fact as to what law 
should be applied. The correct rule which should have been 
applied by the court is that the cause of action for contribu-
tion does not accrue until one joint tortfeasor has "b£ payment, 
discharged the common liability or more than his pro rata 
share thereof" (78-27-39) and as such, until defendants Salt Lake 
County, Daniel Ipson or third-party defendant Emil Zigich 
discharge payment for a higher share of their liability, no 
act for contribution exists. This "act" of payment is the 
final condition which ripens the right to contribution into 
a viable and enforceable right to judgment. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Th e case of Silver King Coalition Mines Company v. 
Industrial Commission. 2 Utah 2d 1. 268 P.2d 689 (1954). is 
M » ! • • • ! "»• n m mi l» • • » . • • i . ! • l | i n i i » i i i ' ' ' 
extremely analagous to the instant case. In that case the 
employer of a deceased workman had appealed to this court 
from an award of the Industrial Commission which gave to the 
workman's widow certain benefits derived from the Workmen's 
Compensation and Occupational Disease Act, Just as in this 
case, the chronological order of events was crucial: the 
decedent was employed with the Silver King Coalition Mine 
Company from 1938 to 1949, He died in the Utah State Tuberculosis 
Sanitorium in 1952, a little more than three years after 
leaving that employment. Prior to 1951, a statute was in 
effect that no compensation would be paid for the death from 
silicosis "unless the death results within two years from 
the last day upon which the employee actually worked." In 
1951 this section was amended adding a new provision which 
extended this time period to five years from the last day 
worked in those cases where death "results from silicosis 
complicated by active tuberculosis and such silico-tuberculosis 
is evidenced by positive laboratory sputum tests and x-rays 
and other clinical findings." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The employer argued that its liability arose out of 
the employee-employer relationship maintained with the 
deceased and that its duties were fixed at the date of last 
exposure to silicious dust. The employer further argued 
that the fact the workman did not die with the two-year 
period fixed as a condition precedent to recovery under the 
original act exonerated it from any obligation and that the 
subsequent amendment could not be applied retroactively* 
This court rejected the employer's argument and held 
that the statute did not have to be applied retroactively 
even though its application depended upon facts occurring 
prior to the enactment of the amended statute. The court 
said: 
Recognizing the fact that a cause of action 
for the dependents of a deceased workman requires 
that the cause of death originated in an injury 
or disease compensible under the Act, our inquiry 
must turn to whether or not the application of 
the present statute would give retroactive effect 
to that statute. Although it is an independent 
right of action, an unqualified right to death 
benefits does not arise either at the time of the 
injury or last exposure or at the death of the 
employee. At the time of the last exposure, it 
is a potential right of action which may or may 
not mature into an enforceable cause of action, 
depending upon the happening of conditions subse-
quent. * * * * The death of Glade Mitchell was 
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the last event which completed a cause of action 
in his dependents, 
A statute is not made retroactive merely 
because it draws on antecedent facts for its 
operation. 
» 
* * * 
Whether or not the amendment would apply to the 
workman1s claim is not here decided; the cause 
of action of his dependents had not yet arisen, 
even though the greater part of the incidents 
necessary to the maintenance of the action had 
occurred, and thus the statute applies to them. 
* * * [Ijnasmuch as the amendment here is 
applied to a cause of action coming into existence 
after the effective date and no vested right falls 
to the application of the statute, we hold that it 
is not retroactive in its effect. 268 P.2d 691-693. 
(Emphasis added.) . , . • 
The accident in this case occurring before the enactment 
of the Contribution Statute is similar to the working and 
last exposure of the decedent in Silver King Coalition 
Mines. Both acts created a potential right of action which 
may or may not have matured into an enforceable cause of 
action depending upon the happening of conditions subsequent. 
I n
 Silver King it required the death of the decedent from 
certain causes within a certain period of time. In this 
case it requires the payment by a joint tortfeasor in excess 
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of his common liability or pro rata share. If this excess 
payment does not occur, then the cause of action for contribu-
tion does not accrue and defendants in this case would not 
have the right to seek a money judgment from the third-party 
defendant. Thus, an action to enforce a judgment based upon 
contribution cannot be maintained until the conclusion of 
the present action between plaintiff and defendants and then 
only contingently depending upon the outcome of this litigation. 
These "conditions subsequent11 remove the contribution statute 
from any question of retroactivity as to those payments made 
subsequent to the enactment of the statute. Therefore, the 
trial court's determination that the date of the accident 
was controlling is clearly erroneous. 
Because this important question of application has never 
been decided by this court and because of the great importance 
this decision will have upon other litigation now pending, 
appellants have surveyed the other states facing similar 
problems and believe that the results obtained clearly show 
that the prevailing rule is that the date of judgment 
or payment of a disproportionate share of liability must 
control in deciding the application of a contribution statute. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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While there are cases to the contrary in other jurisdictions, 
the following cases represent the majority view concerning 
application of newly-passed contribution statutes. 
CALIFORNIA 
In 1959 a lower appellate court in Hudson v. Hutchason, 
340 P.2d 756 (App. Div. Cal. 1959), interpreted the enacting 
clause of the contribution statute in California. The 
clause stated that the contribution procedure would apply 
to "causes of action occurring on or after January 1, 1958." 
The appellant maintained that the cause of action arose when 
the joint tortfeasor discharged the entire judgment or paid 
more than his pro rata share as defined in the statute. The 
respondent argued that the date of tort liability controlled. 
The appellate court held that "cause of action" referred to 
the discharge of the obligation and not to the date of original 
tortious conduct. In 1961 the Supreme Court of California in 
Augustus v. Bean, 363 P.2d 873 (Cal. 1961), affirmed the 
Hudson decision. The court stated: 
^m^gmmmmmmmmmmmmm 
The statutory system for contribution does 
not concern the relationship of tortfeasors to the 
one injured but deals with the relationships of 
tortfeasors to each other when, after entry of 
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judgment, one of them discharges the common 
liability* In such a system it is clear that 
the important consideration is when the judgment 
is entered and payment made to the injured party, 
not the date of the tort. Id. at 874. 
DELAWARE 
The Supreme Court of Delaware in Halifax Chick Express 
v. Young, 137 A.2d 743 CDel, 1958), rejected a lower courtfs 
decision that the contribution act applied only to cases 
arising from torts committed after the date of its passage. 
The Delaware Supreme Court stated: "It is the discharge of 
the common liability that gives rise to the right of contribu-
tion; not the commission of a tort." Icl. at 745. 
HAWAII 
In Albert v. Dietz, 283 P. Supp. 854 (D. Hawaii 1968), 
a diversity suit was brought against a golf professional for 
damages allegedly arising out of an accident involving a golf 
cart. The golf professional moved to implead as a third-party 
defendant the county which allegedly owned and operated the 
golf course . The county attempted to escape liability on 
the theory that no presentation of claim had been made within 
the six-month statutory limit from the date of the plaintiff's 
injuries. The Federal District Court rejected this claim 
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holding that the cause of action did not arise until the 
payment by a joint tortfeasor had occurred.. The court quoted 
with approval the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Western Casualty 
& Surety Company v. Milwaukee G. C. Company. 251 N.W. 491 
— > — • • I . » I I I . I I I . » I I W I » I MI III i illll in • — i — i L p ^ w w I I mm IQJJIIII ' " m » « <"i»——WWHIIWIIIUMMWJIIH «ni»nm mini m i u iW n wlm ' 
(Wis. 1933), where that court stated: r 
Logically, it would appear that the right 
[to contribution] comes into being when the 
combination of negligent acts gives force and 
direction to events necessarily resulting in 
an occasion for paying damages. This does not 
depend upon action being begun. * * * It has 
its inception at the time the negligence of the 
alleged tortfeasors concurs to bring the injuries 
to the third person. It springs up at that time, 
and then and forever afterwards, until the claim 
is outlawed, they or either of them are under a 
liability to pay for injuries their negligent 
acts have caused. This inchoate right ripens 
into a cause of action when one of the joint 
tortfeasors pays more than his proportionate 
share of the claim for which all are liable. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The court relying upon this same reasoning held that the 
county could not be dismissed as a third-party defendant. 
IOWA 
In the recent case of Dairyland Insurance Company v. 
Mumert, 212 N.W. 2d 436 (Iowa 1973), a reverse situation 
occurred illustrating again that payment rather than the 
act itself is controlling. In that case the plaintiff's 
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insured purchased alcohol from the defendant in December of 
1971 at which time the insured became intoxicated and collided 
with another automobile owned by a third party. At that time, 
contribution was in effect. On January 1, 1972, the Iowa 
Legislature passed an amendment to Iowafs contribution statute 
which prohibited an insurance company from seeking contribu-
tion from a vender of alcohol, A settlement was made with 
the injured party on February 1, 1972 and payment made. 
The lower court held that since the payment and settlement 
was made subsequent to the restricting amendment the fact 
that the accident had occurred prior to the amendment was 
immaterial. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the lower court1s 
decision and held that a claim against a joint tortfeasor 
ripens into a cause of action only when one of the joint 
tortfeasors pays more than his share of the claim for which 
all are liable. Obviously, had the date of the tort been 
controlling, the court would have allowed contribution on 
behalf of the insurance carrier. 
LOUISIANA 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana in Brown v. New Amsterdam 
Casualty Company, 142 So.2d 796 (La. 1962), faced a factual 
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situation substantially identical to the instant case. In 
this instance an accident occurred between a car being driven 
by Brown and a truck operated by Jones, Suits were brought 
by passengers in the Brown automobile against Jones and Jones 
sought to implead the driver Brown as a third-party defendant. 
The lower court dismissed this third-party complaint and 
was affirmed by the intermediate appellate court. However, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that a third-party 
action for contribution was proper. The Supreme Court 
characterized these decisions as being based upon the false 
premise "that the rights of joint tortfeasors, as between 
themselves, arise on the commission of the tort." 
The Louisiana Supreme Court succinctly stated the 
principle relied upon by appellant in the instant casei 
It is true that as of that time the injured 
party's right and cause of action against either 
or both of two joint tortfeasors come into being; 
and conversely, the obligation of each of the latter 
to the claimant also commences. On the other hand, 
the rights and obligations as between the joint 
wrongdoers do not there arise because they are 
not created by virtue of the commission of the 
tort and of the provisions of the revised civil 
code article 2315. Rather, they spring from the 
principle of contribution, enunciated in Article 
2103 and our jurisprudence, which is required of 
solidary obligors when one has been compelled to 
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pay the full amount of the obligation. And it 
is only after judicial demand has been made on 
»•»<! mi m ».ULIH.I|III.IPH.II IIIIJII .mmiin Hjj'HM. •n,»Iijjii|iLimiij))iinim.i ^•ii'«pm.iii.i.i i,i. u.) i»v,",'.»»l*",-'MI*)"».»"Wi' ••"'. ' '! '""» ""•" ' • -•-• " » " ' ^ 1 1 W - ' W •'» "1 lU'ttJUl W '«JR 
one of two or more solidarily obligated tortfeasors 
that he can have any possible interest in seeking 
contribution* 
Therefore, herein, when the 1960 amendment 
to revise civil code Article 2103 became effective 
on January 1, 1961 there were no rights or obliga-
tion in esse as between (Jones) * * * on the one 
hand, and the third-party action defendant (Brown) 
(the instant suits were not filed until after that 
date>) ; and, as a consequence, those codal provisions 
could not possibly have affected any pre-existing 
substantive rights as between such parties. From 
which it falls that it is immaterial whether the 
relief afforded by the 1960 amendment is substantive 
or procedural. 
The Brown decision was followed shortly thereafter in Caruso 
•'""WW Wiiwiim - " 
v. New York Insurance Company, where the lower appellate 
court held that the date of judicial demand was controlling 
as to the right of a third-party plaintiff to demand and 
obtain contribution from negligence which occurred prior 
to the effective date of the contribution statute. 150 S,2d 
337 (1965). 
MARYLAND 
In Southern Maryland Oil Company v. Texas Company, 203 
i>m,jf |i»mii.iiii i • • iii.iiiM.if HITIIIH 'U..WH • )^W i^wnii»u,iMiiij|nij»iiin,uuHi fa. umOi|»»i '• ' " " • i" * P-"" ' I "" ' " * " w.iffi 
F. Supp. 449 (D. Md. 1962), the Federal Court in Maryland 
held that under Maryland law the right to indemnification and 
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to contribution, whether based upon contract or tort, accrues 
at the time of the payment and not before. The court held 
that the statute of limitations began to run from the time 
of settlement and not from the time of the original injury. 
The court said: "Thus we have here the assertion of alleged 
rights that do not spring directly or solely from the act 
of negligence. Rather, these are derivative rights, which 
remain inchoate and upon which no judgment could have been 
obtained until after the various settlements or, had the 
primary suits been resolved differently, until the claimants 
there had obtained judgments which had been satisfied." 
Id, at 42, 
MISSISSIPPI 
In Klaas v. Continental Southern Lines, 82 S,2d 705, 
»"»•• " "'
Jl
 ' ' " "' " ' n ' J t J W ' " " * " " " " * " t-if.?1 ' "I U"""U,!«!i ' U A L •'»|;i|iiJ'«wi.'M'i»uji'i«ii"i»i—'ii«n,w»i' 
the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed a lower court's 
determination that a contribution action could lie where 
the judgment had been obtained before the contribution statute 
went into effect. The court held that the act only applied 
to judgments entered after the effective date of the statute 
and implied that the date of the tort was not material in 
the determination of the statute's application. 
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~ 
NEW JERSEY 
Boi;h the New Jersey Legislature and the New Jersey 
Supreme Court stated the rule which should be applied to 
contribution statutes. The Legislature enacted New Jersey 
Statute 2At53A-4 which stated: "This statute is made 
applicable to all actions for contribution commenced, and 
to all judgments recovered, after the effective date" of 
the enactment, "irrespective of the time of the commission 
of the wrongful act or acts by the joint tortfeasors; 
provided, that it shall not apply with respect to payments 
made prior to the effective date," The Supreme Court of 
New Jersey in the case of Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. 
" * II "JUJI 11.11 I » lllllgj,ll|»HJM I IIIHI II m*H IIIHUJI •Hll.llfltlMlW, I. II.' UU H)III'I»IIH.. W »ll ! ! • HI II I'll P 
Rosenthal, 102 A.2d 587 (N.J. 1954), emphasized again 
that the payment is the controlling factor for a right 
of contribution: 
The statutory right of action for contribution 
accrues only on the payment by a joint tortfeasor 
of a money judgment recovered against him for the 
injurious consequences of the wrong; and by clear 
and imperative terms the right is enforceable as 
to payments made on the underlying judgment after 
the law came into being, even though the judgment 
was entered before. The payment beyond the payer1s 
i""'».lll" "t. «*•""»• ' •$ .•*'• • «ML" i n i i i ii i i 1 uulUwi m-lll' i I'IIIJI. • • • Wi W1 '»• ' •*»"' 
pro rata share is the act which gives rise to the 
•T'IIWJIW n iwp LI • H|.IJ.III'•.»'..! "wmg,..!. i ..^JMUI mi »»!•! • » • ! i'n mi m fjj,,
 U m • • iiU'in miilH r • • ! » ' • • • ' ' ! " • '••«• mm HI" «. • inn. minwi—II 
statutory right of restitution. Id. at 591. 
* H M » I ' U . U I II ii i HI i i I I I ii >ilr H I i n •••niiifw i u i i n i l m IH,HIHJU» iIU^III minm — I I I J U H I I iii.Liinnmij,i| I' « m » 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The Superior Court of New Jersey in Markey v. Skog, 
322 A.2d 513 '(N.J. Super. 1974) , held that a governmental 
entity could not be dismissed as a third-party defendant 
for failure to give statutory notice from the time of the 
tort when the controlling date is the payment by a joint 
tortfeasor of more than his pro rata share. 
NEW YORK 
In Deuscher v. Cammerano, 176 N.E. Rptr. 412 (N.Y. Ct. 
I M I % W U ' " M I w wrnn juv .•nii.miu i j . Mj^jini I , I > , » H I i i i j .n . in i i . uw'in " 
App. 1931) , the New York Court of Appeals held that the lower 
court erred in ruling that a tortfeasor could not sue for 
contribution against a joint tortfeasor for torts committed 
prior to the enactment of the statute. The court stated: 
"To hold with the appellate division that Section 211-A only 
applies to torts committed after its passage would have 
left Cammerano liable for the full amount of the judgment 
without any recourse over to his co-defendant." The court 
held that the right of contribution only accrues upon the 
payment of an excess share of the liability. 
PENNSYLVANIA 
In Brenneis v. Marley, 5 D & C 2d 20 (Penn. D. Ct. 1955.) 
' * " » ' ) • n w n imui inwt '.»i ' i i HI i jii I . I I M I mi u * ! r f * 
the court in interpreting the Pennsylvania contribution 
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statute nearly identical to Section 78-27-39 held that a 
verdict rendered after the effective date of the Pennsylvania 
act was subject to the contribution provisions even though 
the tort giving rise to the action took place prior to the 
statute's enactment. 
VIRGINIA 
The Federal District Court in Virginia in the case of 
Laws v. Spain, 312 P. Supp, 315 (D. Vir. 1970), held that 
the right to contribution arises only upon an unfair payment. 
The court said: 
The right to contribution arises when one joint 
tortfeasor has paid a claim for which the other joint 
tortfeasor is also liable. The right to maintain the 
action for contribution need not be founded upon a 
judgment determining the issues of negligence. It 
may be based upon a compromise settlement, rather 
than a judgment. Butf the right to contribution 
arises only when one tortfeasor has paid or settled 
a claim for which the other wrongdoer is liable. 
• i .jinn ii i» i • • •« . ! »i-gm»M ii JII ii i i . . I . H , . . . I — mn i m. i n nnmniinii.il ii m m m i l mi n> y i <<ii.ni n n m • » n ' " " " " " " " » • • ' •' 
Id. at 318. (Emphasis added.) 
WISCONSIN 
The Wisonsin court has held on several occasions that 
while the right of contribution by the joint tortfeasors 
arises at the time of the concurring independent acts, it 
is not until one of the joint tortfeasors pays more than 
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his proportionate share of the underlying claim that the right 
ripens into a cause of action/ See Ainsworth v. Berg, 34 
N.W. 2d 790 (Wis. 1948); Western Casualty & Surety Company v. 
Milwaukee G. C Company, 251 N.W. 491 (Wis. 1933). 
Other authorities are in agreement with the principle 
that the cause of action for contribution does not accrue 
until time of payment. In American Jurisprudence 2d the 
following statement is found: " 
While it is true that a common burden or 
obligation resting upon the parties is essential 
to the accrual of the right of contribution, no 
cause of action therefor arises merely because 
of the relationship of the parties or because of 
the claimant's liability on such obligation. The 
right to contribution is inchoate or subordinate 
from the time of the creation of the relationship 
giving rise to the common burden until the time 
or payment by a co-obligor of more than his 
proportional share, and as a rule, the right 
to contribution becomes complete and enforceable 
only upon a payment or its equivalent by the 
' '"'"Claimant discharging, satisfying, or extinguishing 
the whole or more than his just and equitable 
share of the common obligation, provided the 
obligation is due at the time. Or, stated in 
terms applicable to actions at law, the implied 
promise to contribute is considered as made at 
the time the common liability is assumed, and 
the right to sue thereon arises when a party has 
paid or satisfied the whole of the obligation or 
more than his share thereof. 18 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Contribution, Section 9, p. 20-21. (Emphasis 
... added.) 
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Corpus Juris Secundum makes the following statement • 
The right of contribution is inchoate front 
the date of the creation of the relation between 
the parties, but it is not complete, so as to 
be enforceable until there has been an actual 
'"• '• • — nip inn i»M'iiiniiW|i H*1"* '•• M " ! ' i p j j y n , i n . . m i f HWH'""!' '.' T ' " H m "P* ••• '* 1 » " ' " " 1 "»' • 'I " * ' '* •" •** 
payment, in whole or in part, of the common 
obligation or until something is done equivalent 
to a discharge thereof, 18 C.J.S. Contribution, 
Section 4, p, 7. (Emphasis added.) 
In summary, this court in the Silver King Coalition 
« * ' mt'W •" ' " . ' ' • W i w «• ' •»•• ' • • » * ' • • • • l Hl^UiJI Ml . , — • „ • « ill 
Mine case has clearly stated the rule that a statute is 
not made retroactive merely because it draws on antecedent 
facts for its operation. The fact that the accident in this 
case occurred prior to the enactment of the statute is 
irrelevant to these defendants1 right of action in contribution 
against the driver of the plaintiff's automobile/ Since 
contribution is conditional upon the finding of joint 
liability and upon the payment of a disproportionate share 
of the obligation it is possible that the right of contribution 
in this case may never accrue were the jury to find the 
third-party defendant or the defendants themselves not liable 
to the plaintiff or were the joint tortfeasors to pay their 
proportionate share of any judgment obtained. 
Defendants are not asking this court to award contribution. 
Rather, defendants ask that the third-party defendant driver 
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be impled into this action so that liability and proportion 
of fault can be determined in one action and so that the 
right of contribution can later be enforced if necessary. 
As can be seen by the preceding survey of cases throughout 
the country, this request is proper under Utah's new contribu-
tion statutes, 
•f ." : > POINT II 
»MWJg-,.f,'- v>m -vu«i. 
THE APPLICATION OF THE UTAH CONTRIBUTION STATUTES 
DOES NOT TAKE AWAY OR IMPAIR VESTED RIGHTS ACQUIRED 
UNDER EXISTING LAWS PRIOR TO ITS ENACTMENT, DOES NOT 
CREATE A NEW OBLIGATION, DOES NOT IMPOSE A NEW DUTY, 
AND DOES NOT ATTACH A NEW DISABILITY IN RESPECT TO 
TRANSACTIONS OR CONSIDERATIONS ALREADY PASSED. 
As previously discussed in Point I of this brief, the 
cause of action for contribution, if any, will not accrue 
until well after the passage of the contribution statute# 
Therefore, the statute in this case would not be applied 
retroactively. However, even if it were assumed that some 
retroactive application must occur to the date of the 
accident, such application is permissible since no substantive 
changes have occurred by the passage of this.act* 
Again, the Silver King Coalition Mine case is controlling. 
This court in that case stated: ,: Is',:~v;. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-28-
A law is retrospective, in its legal sense, 
which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired 
under existing laws or creates a new obligation, 
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability 
in respect to transactions or considerations already 
passed, 268 P.2d at 692. 
The court in ruling that the amended Occupational Disease 
Act was not retrospective stated considerations which are 
analagous to the instant case: 
No new duty is imposed upon the employer by 
applying the present statute, for the obligation 
of paying compensation to the employee, if he 
contracted the disease of silicosis, and to his 
dependents if he died of silicosis, was, and 
must be, contemplated in the formation of the 
employee-employer relationship under the laws of 
Utah. There was no time at which the employer 
could maintain that a right to be free from this 
liability had vested. This right must be contingent 
upon the happening of conditions subsequent, an 
expectation that the employee would not become 
ill, that if he did become ill the Commission 
would not make an award, that he would not die, 
that if he did die he would not die within the 
period prescribed by the statute. Certainly, 
the employer could not maintain that his duties 
were fixed at the time of employment not at the 
death of the injury. * * * It is often said that 
a right is not "vested" unless it is something 
more than such a mere expectation as may be based 
upon an anticipated continuation of the present 
laws. * * * These courts (in other jurisdictions) 
held that an act is not retroactive if it applies 
. I •
 l - • ¥ I| II , . II I I ,11 I 1 1 l.l !•!,,!. I. fr J l 
to persons who presently possess a continuing 
status even though a part of all of the requirements 
to constitute it were fulfilled prior to the passage 
of the act or amendments thereto. 268 P.2d at 692. 
I IIH1I M P — — HI ••! — — m I  > I !• , | H | I ^ H F » l W f « l l »l Ml—^W^—III IIII lim 
(Emphasis added.) 
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Similarly, in the instant case, third-party defendant 
Zigich cannot claim that there was a time that a right to 
be free from his liability had vested. This right to be 
free from liability was contingent upon the happening of 
conditions subsequent, an expectation that his passengers 
would not bring a lawsuit against him, that if a lawsuit 
was brought that he would be found not negligent, or that 
a judgment would be enforced only against joint tortfeasors 
and not himself. These expectations were not "vested" at 
the time the accident occurred. 
The Supreme Court of Washington in Godfrey v. State, 
530 P.2d 630 (Wash. 1975), held that the defense of comparative 
negligence could be applied retroactively to accidents occurring 
before the enactment of the statute. While as stated previously, 
appellants believe that there is a distinction between comparative 
negligence and contribution, it is obvious that if comparative 
negligence can be applied retroactively then surely contribution 
must also be applied. In any event, the reasoning behind the 
court's decision concerning vested rights is extremely applicable 
to the application of contribution in this case. The court 
stated: 
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Turning to the instant case, it must be noted 
that respondent does not argue that it, or any 
other defendant, would have relied on the common 
law bar to recovery provided by contributory 
negligence when committing the alleged tort of 
negligence. It almost goes without saying that 
the existence or lack of such an affirmative 
defense had no effect on the everyday conduct 
of individuals. Defendants do not act less 
negligently or more so because of the presence 
or absence of an affirmative defense of contribu-
tory negligence. One cannot have a vested right 
in a tort defense the merits of which cannot be 
determined until trial and upon which he does not 
and cannot rely in the initial injury to a plaintiff. 
a>
^
l>*,<*,MI,l*>">"MM"«n«MM»««n«iMMiwaH>NMr>«*»rMi<M«Mnpw>«nP«^^ 
Thus, we hold there is no vested right in the affirma-
tive defense of contributory negligence. 530 P.2d 
at 632. (Emphasis added.) 
Likewise, third-party defendant Zigich cannot claim 
that he drove any less carefully upon the night of the 
accident upon the assumption that there would be no 
contribution between joint tortfeasors. If anything, 
Zigich should have driven more carefully thinking that 
he would not be able to obtain contribution from any joint 
tortfeasor. 
The Supreme Court in California in Augustus v. Bean, 
363 P.2d 873 stated: 
Our construction of Section 880 does not 
give rise to a problem of retroactive impairment 
of a vested right. As of the time of the accident 
a person did not have a vested right at common 
law to avoid paying for the consequences of his 
negligence merely because there were other tort-
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•>••' feasors involved. After the entry of a judgment 
against the joint tortfeasors, each of them was 
liable in full until the judgment was satisfied 
and, if the plaintiff chose to collect from one 
•U- to the exclusion of another, this was a matter 
of chance rather than the result of a right which 
«- became fixed as of the time of the accident. 
Contribution statutes, if applied where an accident 
antedates their enactment, do not retroactively 
increase the liability existing at the time of 
1
 the injury but merely provide a method by which 
the liability of each of the tortfeasors may be 
f: limited to his pro rata share of the judgment, 
363 P.2d at 874-75. 
This court in Boucofski v. Jacobson, 104 Pac. 117 
(Utah 1909) spoke of this "method referred to by the 
California court. The Utah court stated: 
A remedy may be provided for existing rights, 
a new remedy added to or substituted for those 
which exist. Every case must, to a considerable 
extent, depend on its own circumstances. General 
words and remedial statutes may be applied to past 
transactions and pending cases, according to all 
indications of legislative intent, and this may 
be greatly influenced by considerations of 
convenience, reasonableness and justice. Statutes 
enacted to promote and facilitate the administration 
of justice are prominent in the category of remedial 
statutes. Id. at 119-120. 
The courts of Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, Michigan 
and New York have all held that contribution statutes such as 
Utah's new act are remedial in nature and can be applied 
retroactively regardless of when the action is said to accrue. 
In Smith v. Fenner, 161 A.2d 150 (Penn. 1960), the 
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court construed the Pennsylvania statute modeled from the 
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasor Act as one of 
procedure which did not disturb any substantive rights of 
any of the defendants from which contribution was sought* 
The courts in Delaware have held that the application of 
the doctrine of contribution involves procedural or remedial 
law and does not affect a substantive right. Halifax Chick 
Express v. Young, 137 A.2d 743 (Del. 1958); Lutz v. Boas, 
176 A.2d 853 (Ct. Chan. Del. 1961)• 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey extensively examined 
the remedial substantive argument in Pennsylvania Greyhound 
Lines v. Rosenthal, 102 A.2d 587 (N.J. 1954). and made the 
• ' "j?jf "• •" • " " " • ' • " • " 
following explanation as to why the contribution laws were 
procedural and remedial: 
The right of contribution arises out of a payment 
in excess of the payer's just share of the common 
obligation ensuing from a common wrongful act, 
neglect or default—a change of policy equally 
beneficial to all joint tortfeasors. The common 
liability having been theretofore enforceable 
against one or more less than all of the joint 
offenders at the election of the injured person, 
without the benefit of contribution, the enabling 
statutes did not increase the liability of any 
of the participants in the wrong but rather 
lessened it by providing for a just distribution 
of the common burden in lieu of the arbitrary 
choice given to the injured person. The whole 
responsibility cannot now be made to rest upon 
one tortfeasor even though there are joint wrong-
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doers able to bear it. It is but a change of 
remedy without impairment of substantial rights. 
The inequity emanating from the payment is the 
thing redressed. 
There is in the particular circumstances 
no vested right to "protection against contribu-
tion «w Charging the joint tortfeasor with the 
benefit accruing to him from the removal of the 
common burden, according to equity and essential 
justice, does not constitute a new or additional 
obligation; quite the contrary. The joint wrong-
doer does not have a vested right to the payment 
thus made in his behalf by his co-tortfeasor. 
The contribution law "has now remedied this 
inequity and lessened a liability depending 
upon the chance of the plaintiff's choice"; 
the inequity arises from the payment of the 
joint wrongdoer's proportionate share of the 
liability; his several liability for the 
whole is "reduced to a pro rata share with 
his" co-tortfeasor; the "change relates to 
the remedy—to an unnecessary and unjust inequity 
in procedure." 102 A.2d at 594. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Michigan in an early 
decision stated that it could see no reason why the legislature 
may not, at any time before a wrongdoer has paid a judgment 
against himself and others, provide that he may have contribu-
tion, though he did not have the same when the tort was 
committed. The Supreme Court stated: "In our judgment, 
such a change in the law relates only to the remedy. First 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-34-
Finally, the Court of Appeals in New York, in Deuscher 
v, Cammerano, 176 N.E. Rptr. 412 (Ct, App. N.Y. 1931), stated 
the following: "The effect of this amendment (the contribution 
law) as to tortfeasors who are financially responsible is 
the same as if it changed the plaintiff's remedy in the 
collection of a judgment by providing that each joint tort-
feasor was liable only for his pro rata share of the judgment. 
This would be a change in the remedy and affect no 
substantial rights, at least create no new ones. The same 
result is accomplished by the provision that, if the 
plaintiff collects all the judgment out of one, the other 
must pay his share to that one." Id., at 413. (Emphasis 
added.) 
These cases, together with this court's holdings con-
cerning vested rights and remedial law, clearly show that 
a contribution statute does not deprive a defendant of any 
"vested right" nor does it impose any new obligation, new 
duty or impose a new disability upon any defendant which 
did not otherwise exist. The fact that plaintiffs did 
not choose to sue third-party defendant Zigich in the 
original action was a matter of chance and did not involve 
a "right." 
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The application of the contribution statute was designed 
to eliminate the inequity which would result in this case 
were there no contribution statute. Here, without the 
contribution statute, the driver of the plaintiff's auto-
mobile who is legally intoxicated escapes being named as 
a party to the suit because he is a relative or friend 
of the plaintiffs. On the other hand, defendants are 
named as parties and are asked to give plaintiffs the full 
amount of their damages, if any, even though defendant's 
conduct, if negligent, only partially contributed to the 
accident. If any "vested rights" can be claimed they 
should be claimed by defendants since their right to equal 
protection under the laws is left to the caprice of the 
plaintiffs. 
For the preceding reasons, therefore, the Utah Contribu-
tion Statute is a legislative mandate to correct an inadequate 
remedy and procedure which existed prior to its enactment 
but does not affect any vested rights or create any new 
obligations or disabilities which were not present prior to 
its enactment. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-36-
. POINT in :• 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE THIRD-
PARTY COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE THIRD-PARTY 
COMPLAINT WAS PREMATURE SINCE NO PAYMENT HAD BEEN 
MADE IN EXCESS OF DEFENDANT'S PRO RATA SHARE OF 
COMMON LIABILITY. 
The trial court, in its order for dismissal, stated: 
"If contribution should apply to this situation, third-party 
plaintiff's Third-Party Complaint is premature in that 
Section 78-27-39, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
does not create the third-party plaintiff's claim for 
contribution until such time as third-party plaintiffs 
have discharged more than their pro rata share of the 
common liability." v 
From the court's order it is obvious that the court 
determined that a third-party action was improper in any 
case of contribution and that a second action should be 
maintained by a joint tortfeasor only after payment of 
a disproportionate share of a judgment had been made. 
Thus, the court's decision would require two trials in 
every case rather than efficiently joining both actions 
into the plaintiff's original suit. While it is true that 
the right to contribution does not accrue until the time 
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of payment, the question of liability and pro rata share 
may be determined prior to final payment since such a 
determination is more efficient, more consistent, and 
correctly gives a proportionate distribution between joint 
tortfeasors. 
Rule 14A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
"At any time after commencement of the action a defendant, 
as third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint 
to be served upon a person not a party to the action who 
is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's 
claim against him.11 Obviously, this rule allows "premature" 
judgments to be made pending the accrual of the right of 
action. Efficient judicial administration, effective representa-
tion of a joint tortfeasor, and efficient use of judicial 
resources dictate that the logical method of proceeding in 
most situations is to litigate the contribution issue in 
the same lawsuit. 
The New Jersey court has stated this doctrine as 
follows: 
The ascertion by co-defendants in a negligence 
action of a right of contribution inter sese and 
the right of a defendant to implead a joint tort-
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feasor by a third-party complaint before plaintiff's 
cause of action has been reduced to a judgment are 
merely devices of procedural convenience afforded 
by the rules of practice. Thus, although a defendant 
is not necessarily bound to proceed against joint 
tortfeasors in the same action in which plaintiff 
seeks to establish his (defendant's) liability, he 
ordinarily will, nevertheless, do so because a 
single action is the most orderly and logical 
manner in which proof of common liability can be 
established—and it is, of course, common liability 
which is the substantive basis of the right of 
contribution. Markey v. Skog, 322 A.2d 513 (Sup. 
Ct. N.J. 1974). (Emphasis added.) 
The contribution act itself contemplates that joint 
tortfeasors should be tried in the same action. Section 
78-27-43 relating to the release of joint tortfeasors in 
§2 states: "This section shall apply only if the issue 
of proportionate fault is litigated between joint tortfeasors 
in the same action." The term "same action" refers to the 
original action filed by the plaintiff where all tortfeasors 
can be adjudged negligent in their proportional share. 
The third-party complaint in this case asks for an 
adjudication of the percentage of negligence attributable 
to third-party defendant Zigich and for a judgment in the 
amount of that percentage as to the total verdict, if any, 
returned by the jury. While obviously any such judgment 
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could not be enforced until a disproportionate payment 
had been made by defendants to the plaintiffs, the adjudication 
of the percentage of compability would eliminate any further 
actions being filed where the same evidence would have to 
be presented in order to determine the relative degree of 
fault of each tortfeasor. Surely, the efficient use of 
judicial resources should not require two separate lawsuits 
involving the same factual questions to be brought when one 
lawsuit will effectively deal with all issues. 
The trial court's determination that in no situation 
could such an action be commenced prior to payment is clearly 
in error as evidenced by the numerous suits throughout the 
country involving adjudication of a third-party defendant's 
liability prior to payment of a disproportionate share. 
See e.g., Albert v. Dietz, 283 F. Supp. 854 (D. Hawaii 1968); 
Brown v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company, 142 S.2d 796 (La. 
1962); Markey v. Skog, 322 A.2d 513 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1974); 
Dole v. Dowe Chemical Company, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (Ct. App. 
N.Y. 1972). 
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 CONCLUSION 
The trial courtfs order dismissing the third-party 
complaint in this case is in error, The trial court's 
finding that the contribution statute is not retroactive 
is immaterial since the cause of action for contribution 
has not yet accrued because no payment has been made by a 
joint tortfeasor in disproportion to his share of common 
liability. Even if it were assumed that some retroactive 
application must be made, contrary to the great weight of 
authority throughout the country, this third-party complaint 
could still be maintained since the contribution statute 
affects only a remedy or procedure and is not prohibited 
by retroactive legislation. Finallyf the trial court's 
determination that if contribution did exist this action 
was premature, is clearly erroneous since such a matter of 
third-party practice concerns efficient judicial administra-
tion which should eliminate two identical trials being 
necessary. 
This case will establish an important precedent in 
Utah law and will affect many cases presently in litigation 
or about to be brought. The obvious legislative intent 
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of the contribution statutes was to eliminate the inequities 
existing under common law. This court should consider these 
objectives strongly and must interpret the statute to give 
maximum benefits to joint tortfeasors who, except for the 
enactment of the statute, would be forced to pay an inequitable 
share of their adjudicated fault. 
For these reasons, the order of the trial court dismissing 
the third-party complaint must be reversed and remanded. 
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